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Abstract 
To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is 
a need to introduce more spectrally efficient technologies and spectrum management 
regimes. That led to an environment where commercial wireless broadband need to 
share spectrum with the federal and non-federal operations. Implementing sharing 
regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing agreements must be 
implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable.  
With the significant exception of license-free wireless systems, commercial wireless 
services are based on exclusive use. With the policy change facilitating spectrum sharing, 
it becomes necessary to consider how sharing might take place in practice. Beyond the 
technical aspects of sharing, that must be resolved lie questions about how usage rights 
are appropriately determined and enforced. This paper is reasoning about enforcement 
in a particular spectrum bands (1695-1710 MHz and 3.5 GHz) that are currently being 
proposed for sharing between commercial services and incumbent spectrum users in the 
US. We examine three enforcement approaches, exclusion zones, protection zones and 
pure ex post and consider their implications in terms of cost elements, opportunity cost, 
and their adaptability. 
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I. Introduction 
The increasing demand for spectrum makes the introduction of more spectrally efficient 
technologies and management regimes essential. There is recent evidence that the demand for 
spectrum access rights exceeds the available supply [1] [2] [3]. One of the main factors leading 
to this imbalance is that the spectrum is not as well utilized as it could be. The future of wireless 
necessitates that we use spectrum resources more efficiently, which requires a transition to a 
future in which spectrum is shared more intensively. The growing demand pressure for expanded 
access for legacy and new uses and the need for significant spectrum reform to enable such 
sharing was noted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Spectrum Policy Task Force, 
was reaffirmed by the National Broadband Plan [4] and the President's call for an additional 
500MHz of spectrum for mobile broadband [5], and most recently in the PCAST report [6] on 
government spectrum. In addition, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) proposed several bands to facilitate spectrum sharing. 
Realizing the future, where spectrum sharing is the norm requires us to commercialize next 
generation radio technologies such as Cognitive Radios (CRs) to enable the Dynamic Spectrum 
Access (DSA) systems needed to support higher spectrum utilization. These technologies enable 
new business models and spectrum sharing regimes that pose a host of opportunities and 
challenges for spectrum managers and the entire wireless ecosystem. DSA technology promises 
to increase spectrum access and help overcome the lack of available spectrum for new wireless 
services. DSA does this by enabling spectrum sharing between Primary Users (PU) and Secondary 
Users (SU).  
A. Federal and Commercial Sharing 
Spectrum sharing can take many forms of coordination between the PUs and SUs or even 
between the SUs themselves. The focus at this paper will be on non-opportunistic (or 
cooperative) sharing, where an agreement exists between the PUs and the SUs. Such an 
agreement is meaningless if it is not enforceable. Along with several researchers, the PCAST 
report points out that an important part of explicit spectrum sharing arrangements is the ability 
to enforce agreements.   
Sharing between the government incumbents (i.e. Federal or non-Federal agencies) and 
commercial wireless broadband operators/users is one of the key forms of spectrum sharing that 
is recommended by the NTIA and the FCC. In addition, one of the broad visions of the President 
Obama’s Spectrum Initiative [xx] is that the Federal government must ensure sound government 
performance and effective use of its spectrum, pushing for effective repurposing, sharing, and 
innovative uses of spectrum wherever possible. The NTIA issued reports [7] [8]  to evaluate 
different Federal and non-Federal spectrum bands for the near-term viability of accommodating 
wireless broadband systems.  
B. Motivation 
As a consequence of the growth of wireless broadband demand and services of all types, there is 
an urgent need for on-going spectrum policy reform to make spectrum sharing a reality. In 
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spectrum sharing, a spectrum entrant or secondary user is granted usage rights contingent upon 
the licensee’s (or primary user’s requirements or usage). With this policy change, it becomes 
necessary to consider how sharing might take place in practice. Generally speaking, spectrum can 
be shared in frequency, time and geographical dimension or any combination of those 
dimensions. Beyond the technical aspects of sharing, that must be resolved, lie questions about 
how usage rights are appropriately determined and enforced. 
Weiss et.al. [9] examined the question of enforcement in a broad sense.  The paper specifically 
addressed the relationship between ex ante and ex post enforcement measures, as well as taking 
the initial steps needed to relate the cost of enforcement to the needed precision.  The authors 
urged the use of flexible arrangements since these agreements are still nascent. This paper 
advances this by reasoning about enforcement in particular spectrum bands (1695-1710 MHz 
and 3.5GHz bands) that are currently being proposed for sharing between commercial services 
(LTE) and an incumbent spectrum user in the US. 
The analysis in this paper based on the recognition that some interference events are inevitable 
in spectrum sharing.  Thus, the ex ante and ex post enforcement mechanisms serve to (1) 
separate the interference events by consequence on the primary user’s operation and (2) reduce 
the probability of interference events that have a consequence that is considered significant.   
II. Primary and Secondary Users 
The NTIA issued reports [7] [8] to evaluate different Federal and non-Federal spectrum bands for 
the near-term viability of accommodating wireless broadband systems. Those bands include  the 
1675-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, 3500-3650 MHz, and 4200-4220 MHz, 4380-4400 MHz Bands. 
In this paper, the PUs are the Federal and non-Federal agencies whereas the proposed wireless 
broadband systems are the SUs.  
Based on the scope of this paper and the proposed sharing between the Federal and commercial 
parties, the PU’s applications can be fixed, portable or mobile.  On the other hand, the SU could 
be centralized (single interface managing all the secondaries; e.g. LTE operator) or decentralized 
applications (ad hoc networks). Intuitively, if the PU uses the band for fixed services and the SU 
is centralized, spectrum sharing and the associated enforcement mechanisms will be simpler 
compared to other cases. 
Two bands have been examined during this paper: 1675-1710 MHz and 3500-3650 MHz bands. 
In the 1675-1710 MHz band, the PU is fixed and the expected SU is centralized (LTE mobile 
operator). For 3.5 GHz band, the PU is mobile and the expected SUs are mixed with limited power 
transmission (small cells). 
III. The General Aspects of Enforcement 
The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the 
expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless 
demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-
going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share 
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spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing 
harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. 
As described in [9], there are two loci at which usage rights may be enforced: (1) ex ante:  before 
a potentially harmful interference event has occurred; and (2) Ex post: after a potentially harmful 
interference event has occurred. Further, ex ante and ex post approaches work in tandem, not in 
isolation.  Thus, a choice of an ex ante approach affects the ex post strategies.   
The choice of how to design the enforcement mechanism directly and indirectly impacts the 
design and costs of usage rights enforcement.  In particular, the costs of inducing good behavior 
(avoiding bad behavior) must be balanced against the social costs and benefits under different 
scenarios. So, the cost of strong ex ante rules is that they need to be enforceable and may pose 
the risk of overly restricting behaviors that may be welfare enhancing (e.g., innovation) as well 
as decreasing the value of the sharing opportunity for the entrant (i.e., SUs).  
A. Ex ante  
As described above, ex ante enforcement measures are designed to prevent co-channel 
interference from occurring.  The development of exclusion zones – spatial regions where the SU 
may not operate – is a principal ex ante approach.  The cost of an exclusion zone is felt in the 
value that the band has to (potential) secondary users.  Most wireless operators value spectrum 
opportunities by MHz-POP (that is, the population that each MHz of spectrum reaches)1. Thus, 
an exclusion zone in an area of significant population will have the consequence of decreasing its 
value.  Minimizing the use of exclusion zones thus makes the sharing opportunity more attractive, 
especially in populous areas. 
Generally speaking, spectrum can be shared in frequency, time and spatial dimension or any 
combination of those dimensions. So, if two parties are not sharing the spectrum on at least one 
of these three dimensions it is called an exclusive right for that electrospace. In this paper, sharing 
exists in two dimensions: spectrum and time with different levels in the spatial dimension. 
Exclusion zones are a special tool to facilitate ex ante enforcement mechanism, which prevents 
the harmful interference.  Exclusion zones are not the only ex ante enforcement mechanism; 
However, it is the key one and less complicated. 
B. Ex post 
Weak ex ante enforcement mechanisms must often be paired with stronger ex post enforcement 
mechanisms to deal with the inevitable interference events.  In above section, we addressed ex 
ante enforcement through the use of exclusion zones.   Since ex post mechanisms involve the 
adjudication of actual interference events, they typically involve collecting information that can 
be used in agreed-upon adjudication procedures.  In the absence of particular procedures (which 
would normally be negotiated between primary and secondary users), we can assume this 
                                                     
1 Spectrum prices can vary significantly [22].  More recently, Verizon’s AWS spectrum bid has been valued at $0.69 
per MHz-POP and Clearwire’s spectrum has been valued at $0.17-0.22 per MHz-POP 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/12/02/telecom-deals-ratchet-up-price-of-wireless-spectrum/ 
(Last visit at 20 July 2013). 
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information would include the detection of interference events attributable to the SU(s).  It is 
likely that this information would include a time stamp and other information (such as the 
location at which the signal is detected) as well.   
C. Precision of Enforcement 
In general, we consider an enforcement approach to be more precise if it more specifically 
differentiates legitimate users and uses from illegitimate ones. The cost (including the 
complexity) of this depends on some attributes of the system itself. The maximum practical cost 
of enforcement is closely linked to the value of the resource: as the resource becomes more 
valuable, the more worthwhile it may be to invest in more precise enforcement technology.   
For SUs, the most precise enforcement mechanism would be able to control/identify particular 
mobile device (part of SU’s network) on a moment-by-moment basis based on factors such as 
the device’s location and the primary user’s instanteous usage.  Ex ante enforcement would 
involve permission to transmit on the shared band and ex post enforcement would entail 
identifying the precise time and location of SU’ devices whose signals exceeded the agreed-upon 
co-channel interference threshold.  By contrast, the least precise enforcement mechanism would 
involve the creation of large exclusion zones as the ex ante  mechanism, and a simple co-channel 
interference threshold detection system, perhaps with signal classifiers (to exclude non-
secondaries interference) but without any attempt at locating the interfering mobile.   
IV. Case Study-A: MetSat  
The 1675-1710 MHz frequency range (35MHz) is allocated to Meteorological-Satellite (MetSat; 
space-to-earth) and meteorological aids (MetAids; radiosondes) services. It is one the bands 
proposed by NTIA to accommodate new spectrum sharing between Federal/non-Federal and 
commercial usages. However, due to large number of fixed/transportable/mobile non-Federal 
meteorological-satellite earth station receivers that are unlicensed, and rely on meteorological 
data from weather satellites for public safety and other weather related activities, NTIA limited 
the expected sharing band to be the 1695-1710 MHz band (15MHz).  
Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee (CSMAC) formed five working group to 
repurpose candidate bands for wireless broadband; one of them specifically focus on 1695–1710 
MHz Weather Satellite Receive Earth Stations (WG1). According to the last update released from 
WG1 [10], sharing in the 1695-1710 MHz band should be limited to commercial systems 
operations (LTE mobile uplink use only); because, in part, the 1695-1710 MHz is immediately 
adjacent to the AWS-1 uplink band (which will maximize its usefulness for commercial services) 
and also because mobile uplinks transmit at much lower power than downlinks. 
A. Primary and Secondary Users 
Although, there is not much written about the technical specifications of MetSat-earth-stations 
(PU) or LTE-User-Equipment (LTE-UE) that could share the spectrum band, this section will 
provide brief information about the PU and SU in this band. 
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1. MetSat - Primary User 
The PU is the NOAA providing the weather satellite receive earth stations (MetSat) [8] [7]. NOAA 
operates both geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite transmitting systems in the 1675-1710 
MHz band. NOAA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the Department of Interior (DOI) and other Federal and non-Federal 
entities operate earth stations used to receive environmental research and weather data 
transmitted from the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) Polar- Orbiting 
Environmental Satellites (POES). The Meteorological Aids (MetAids) are not considered in this 
paper2. The GOES is for rapid real time observations of hurricanes, severe weather, short-range 
warning and weather forecast models. The POES is for high resolution real time hazard 
observations and weather forecast models. 
MetSat is fixed service working in 1675-1710MHZ band (Space-to-Earth). The NTIA report [8] 
concluded that sharing was possible in the 1695-1710 MHz band (15 MHz) between MetSat 
receive stations and wireless broadband systems. Originally, eighteen federal MetSat earth-
stations will continue to operate where they will be protected by exclusion zones. Based on the 
latest WG1 report [10], there are an additional 9 stations that need protection, resulting in a total 
of 27 earth stations. The interference from geostationary orbit and polar orbit meteorological 
satellite transmitters and radiosonde transmitters to “SU’s base station receivers” was found not 
to be a problem (for more details, see Appendix-A).  
2. LTE – Secondary User 
The SU3 is expected to be a commercial mobile LTE operator where the shared band would be 
used for uplinks from the handsets to the base stations and would be paired with the 2180-2200 
MHz band for the downlink. From the SU perspective, there are many possible scenarios that 
may take place in this sharing environment. It is likely that single or multiple SU(s)4 sharing the 
band with MetSat at the same location. The SU has two possibilities; either it has exclusive LTE 
spectrum bands in addition to MetSat/LTE shared band (1695-1710MHz) or it will have only the 
shared spectrum band, see Figure (1). In case A, the LTE-UE will still have the connectivity by 
handing off from the shared band to an exclusive band. In case B, the LTE-UE will have no choice 
but to stop the service within the boundary of exclusion zones. It is most likely that this band will 
be shared by a LTE operator who has other exclusive LTE bands (case A).  
 
                                                     
2 Based on NTIA analysis results, LTE-UE operated above 1695 MHz will not cause interference to radiosonde 
receivers. 
3 In MetSat case, both “the LTE operator” and “its consumers’ devices (LTE handsets)” are considered as a SU. 
4 Multiple SUs means multiple LTE operators and each one has his own users.  
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Figure (1): Shared and Exclusion LTE bands  
3. Types of Co-channel Interference  
Generally speaking, there are two types of co-channel interference that may exist due to the 
sharing scenario illustrated in this paper5:  
i. Interference from SU to PU: 
This is the critical interference in this case where the PU should be protected. It is the 
interference from LTE-UE (i.e. user’s handset) to MetSat-earth-station. 
ii. Interference from PU to SU 
This type of interference is caused by MetSat satellite (space-to-earth) or “radiosonde 
transmitter" to SU base station (LTE-base-station). The exclusion zone size will defined 
based on MetSat-earth-station and LTE-UE characteristics only, not the satellite beam 
footprint. As a result of that, the space-to-earth signal will interfere with the LTE-base-
stations, which may need special filters to avoid this interference. The value of this shared 
spectrum (1695-1710) will be affected if the footprint of space-to-earth signal is very large 
compared to the exclusion zone size. This issue is not considered in this paper, where we 
assume that the SUs expected this before it shared the band. 
B. Tradeoff between Ex Ante and Ex Post  
In the case of MetSat and LTE sharing, the question (more precisely) is what the cost of various 
ex post enforcement mechanisms are and how that affects the ex ante rules, which, in turn, 
potentially affects the value of the secondary sharing.  Currently, NTIA proposed mechanism has 
emphasized ex ante controls (e.g., a large exclusion zone) with no significant consideration of ex 
post mechanisms, i.e., the detection of events above certain level6 of Interference-to-Noise-Ratio 
that are clearly attributable to LTE and the adjudication of those events.   
Shrinking the exclusion zone, the need for ex post action increases because we would expect the 
occurrence of potentially actionable events to increase. Figure (2) illustrates this idea. 
                                                     
5 Here, the co-channel interference that already exists before sharing is not mentioned. 
6 At the NTIA Fast Track report analysis [8]; the value of SNIR was chosen to be (-10dB) which based originally on 
ITU-R Recommendation SA1026. 
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Figure (2): Tradeoff between ex ante and ex post enforcement. 
C. Ex Ante Enforcement 
As discussed above, the use of exclusion zones is the main tool to facilitate ex ante enforcement; 
however, it is not the only ex ante enforcement mechanism.  If the focus is on minimizing 
significant interference events, an alternative ex ante approach could be for NOAA (in this case) 
to receive satellite transmissions from multiple geographically distributed earth stations (if the 
satellite footprint is large enough), some located in unpopulated areas.  This diversity of 
reception from such statistically uncorrelated channels would allow significant interference 
events to be reduced.  If this strategy is used in conjunction with exclusion zones, then it could 
reduce the size of exclusion zones, albeit at the cost of system re-engineering and post-reception 
data processing.   
1. Exclusion Zones  
Since the PU (MetSat) is a satellite-based system, much is known about their spectrum usage 
requirements.  The frequency bands/channels are fixed, the orbits of the satellites are 
predictable and the technical specifications are known. As a result, constructing a database that 
summarizes all of this information that can be accessed easily by SUs is a straight-forward 
exercise.  Since the SU is an LTE mobile operator, they have full management control over the 
remotes and provide for a single point for database access.  Because of this, there is no need for 
the SU to sense the PU signal.  Thus, the best cost effective context awareness technique [11] is 
the database approach. This conclusion is consistent with the PCAST report recommendation of 
using the database approach in this type of spectrum sharing environment [6]. 
The radius for each exclusion zone was computed based on aggregate interference from wireless 
broadband systems. The exclusion zone analysis took into account: (1) representative technical 
and deployment characteristics for the LTE handsets; and (2) representative technical 
characteristics of MetSat-earth-stations. 
8 
 
2. Developing Exclusion Zones 
Some MetSat-earth-station parameters and technical specifications are well known and fixed, 
such as geographical location and antenna gain. While this information is needed to measure the 
allowable interference threshold, it can be supplemented with dynamic information, which will 
require the SU to be connected continuously and which allows for small exclusion zones. There 
are three level of dynamicity; detailed as follow: 
i. Dynamics of Exclusion Zones 
Since the antenna orientation of the MetSat-earth-station is not fixed, the use of fixed exclusion 
zones represents a worst-case solution. In any particular reception episode, the exclusion zone is 
ovate, as shown in Figure (3). If a static exclusion zone is used, it must be the union of all possible 
antenna positions.  It would thus be large compared with the exclusion zone associated with a 
particular receiving episode.  From the NTIA report [8], Appendix-B shows the exclusion zone 
radius around the MetSat-earth-stations7. 
 
Figure (3): It illustrates the concept of Dynamic Exclusion Zones; the exclusion zone will shift and vary based on 
the orbit parameters and technical specifications (the base-station is fixed). 
If exclusion zones could be focused on the current signal reception episode, then the particulars 
of the satellite orbit could be considered and the exclusion zone could be reduced in size to 
account for the earth station’s instantaneous antenna position.  SUs would use the database to 
adjust their transmission footprint in real time to avoid the exclusion zone.  As a result, the size 
of the exclusion zone would be smaller at any point in time than a static exclusion zone.  However, 
the SU’s spectrum opportunity would be interruptible near the earth station, resulting in 
spectrum sharing similar to what might be found with rotating beam radars [12].   
 
 
                                                     
7 The exclusion zone were considered large enough to protect the MetSat-earth-stations regardless of station 
movement (fixed exclusion zone). 
9 
 
ii. Satellite Channel 
Basically, the MetSat system works in the band 1675-1710MHz as illustrated below. So, at single 
point of time, the MetSat-earth-station will receive the signal via one channel in this band 
(assuming the antenna can receive one channel at a time). The shared portion of this band is just 
15MHz (less than 50% [15Mhz/35MHz]); see Figure (4). 
As an example, if we take the technical specification of the Monterey, California earth station 
(see Table (1)), we find that there are three center frequencies (i.e. channels) that are used to 
receive the satellite signal (1698, 1702.5 and 1707)8. For each channel, there will be a separate 
dynamic exclusion zone. If the station is receiving at any channel outside this 15MHz (i.e.  within 
the 1675-1695MHz), then there is no exclusion zone at that point of time. 
  Meteorological-Satellite (MetSat) service 
 Meteorological aids (MetAids) (radiosondes) service 
 
20MHz (Not shared) 15MHz (shared) 
        1675                                                      1695                                         1710 
Figure (4): Tradeoff between ex ante and ex post enforcement. 
Parameter Value 
Center Frequency (MHz) 1698, 1702.5, 1707 
Receiver 3 dB Intermediate Frequency Bandwidth (MHz) 1.33 
Receiver IF Selectivity (relative attenuation (dB) as a function of 
frequency offset (MHz)) 
-3 dB @ +/- 0.6655 MHz 
-20 dB @ +/- 1.34 MHz 
-60 dB @ +/- 12 MHz 
Noise Figure (dB) 1.8 
Mainbeam Antenna Gain (dBi) 29 
Antenna Height (meters) above local terrain 33 
Elevation Angle (degrees) 5 
Table (1): Receiver Equipment, Monterey, California, HRPT [8]. 
3. Opportunity Cost of Exclusion Zones 
There are 27 MetSat fixed earth stations that need protection; see Figure (5) and exclusion zones 
have been proposed for each [7] (Details in Appendix B)9. Since there are large areas between 
those stations that are not part of an exclusion zone, significant spectrum sharing opportunities 
exist. However, some of the exclusion zones are in areas that have significant POPs (e.g., 
Washington DC or Miami FL), so reducing exclusion zones can have a significant impact on the 
value of the spectrum opportunity for SUs.   
                                                     
8 Based on NTIA fast track repost, these three channels (centered at 1698, 1702.5 and 1707MHz) are used by POES 
Meteorological-Satellites to send “High Resolution Picture Transmission” service. 
9 Note: originally, there are only 18 earth-stations addressed at NTIA report published at Oct. 2010 [8]. 
10 
 
 
Figure (5): Federal MetSat receive stations. 
 
Figure (6): Approximate Exclusion zones for Suitland, MD and Wallops Island, VA  
11 
 
Figure (6) illustrates the proposed static exclusion zones for the Washington, DC area (for the 
MetSat earth stations in Suitland, MD and Wallops Island, VA (based on NTIA calculations) [13].  
These exclusion zones effectively cover the populations of the Richmond VA, the Washington DC 
Metro area, the Baltimore MD metro area and possibly the Norfolk, VA and the Wilmington DE 
metro areas.  Excluding the rural populations, this amounts to roughly 11.5 million people.  With 
a bandwidth of 15MHz, this area would represent 172.5 million POPs for a wireless operator.  
Using Verizon’s valuation of the nearby AWS band in their proposed spectrum swap, this 
exclusion zone is “worth” approximately $119 million.  Small reductions in the exclusion zone 
would have significant payoffs: reducing the zone so that Richmond VA would no longer be 
excluded would be worth approximately $13.5 millon; shrinking the exclusion zone so that it 
avoids Baltimore would be worth almost $28 million.  Of course, the biggest prize in this is the 
Washington DC metro area; the 15MHz of spectrum in question would be worth approximately 
$58 million. 
These costs are directly borne by the SUs as their spectrum use is affected by the exclusion zone.  
However, if the SU is cooperative, then the costs of the exclusion zone would be shared by the 
PU in that contract prices would be lower.   
In the case of MetSat, sharing is being “encouraged” by the NTIA, acting as spectrum manager 
for federal spectrum use.  If SUs of the 1695-1710 MHz band do not incur direct costs for this use, 
then agencies would have an incentive to develop large exclusion zones, as the cost would be 
borne entirely by the SUs.  If SUs must pay for the right of secondary use, then the costs would 
be shared because SUs would rationally pay less if the exclusion zones were large.  If the PU did 
not recognize clear benefits to sharing, exclusion zones would again be large because the PU 
would be bearing the cost of interference without an offsetting benefit.   
D. Ex Post Enforcement 
Exclusion zones do not provide a guarantee of co-channel interference avoidance. Since 
propagation is unpredictable, uplink signals could occasionally travel farther than expected. 
Furthermore, the exclusion zones do not explicitly account for tall features, like tall buildings and 
mountains that can cause longer than expected propagation distances. As a result, ex post 
mechanisms may be needed to provide data to PUs and SUs to further tune the system for future 
interference avoidance or to optimize the sharing system to better state. 
Attributing an interference event to a SU is necessary for appropriate adjudication.  It is not 
reasonable to hold SUs accountable for interference events that they did not cause.  For example, 
inter-modulation products from a nearby but unrelated user could cause significant 
electromagnetic energy to occur in the PU’s band, causing interference.  To associate 
interference event with the SU(s) means that the PU has either some knowledge about the SU’s 
signal characteristics and/or an identification code that can easily be obtained by demodulating 
part or all of the SU’s signal.  For example, in the case of MetSat, the uplink sharing is an LTE-UE, 
which has a distinct electromagnetic signature.  Also in this case, the 15MHz of bandwidth that 
is being proposed for sharing implies that only one LTE secondary user would exist in any sharing 
zone.  Thus, demodulation of the LTE signal to uniquely identify the SU may not be necessary, 
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reducing ex post enforcement costs.  If multiple SUs exist, the LTE signal would have to be 
demodulated to identify the source of the interference, which is more costly. 
As was argued in [9], spectrum sharing is a complex dynamical multi-stakeholder systems that 
could benefit from the feedback provided by practice; so that the system can be optimized to 
perform “better” (by whatever set of attributes).  A collaborative, adaptive approach to ex ante 
and ex post enforcement could result in benefits to both parties.  The PU could look forward to 
a decreasing rate of significant interference events and the SU could look forward to reduce ex 
ante rules (exclusion zones) that would allow them to use the shared spectrum as effectively as 
possible.   
1. Ex Post Optimization 
Following the law and economics literature, the purpose of enforcement is to make rights 
definition meaningful.  If we assume rational economic actors, we can establish some parameters 
around penalties as well as enforcement costs.   
Penalties serve (1) to promote cooperation between primary and secondary user and (2) to 
compensate for violations.  In the case of MetSat, the PU is interested in preserving their ability 
to receive a weak signal, so it is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which a SU is harmed.  Thus, 
in the analysis below, we assume that a SU can harm the PU, but not vice versa.  
To ensure cooperation, the SU should find it cheaper to cooperate than to pay the penalty.  Thus, 
the product of the penalty and the probability of detection should be greater than the benefit 
the SU obtains from transmitting in a way that causes interference. In particular, d × P ≥ B, 
where d is the probability of detection and successful adjudication, P is the penalty paid and B is 
the benefit the SU obtains from transmitting in a way that causes interference. The uncertainties 
of RF propagation mean that interference events may be accidental.  If the average payment is 
based on willful interference, the SU will (1) have an incentive to optimize their system to 
eliminate interference events and (2) be indifferent to intent (i.e., willful or accidental).   
2. Cost Distribution of Ex Post Enforcement 
Given the asymmetry of the MetSat case, ex post enforcement means that the PU must present 
evidence to an adjudicator in support of a claim of interference10.  As well, they may need to 
provide evidence that the interference event was disruptive.  Gathering evidence to support an 
interference claim would almost certainly require the existence of a sensor in the immediate 
proximity of the MetSat earth station in the direction of the main lobe of the antenna (during any 
receive episode).  This sensor must be able to (1) detect signal energy at or above an agreed-
upon interference threshold and (2) determine if the signal energy could reasonably be attributed 
to the SU.  
 In the MetSat case, the 15MHz of bandwidth in question virtually guarantees that a single SU 
exists, and all case studies presented to date indicate that the SU would be an LTE operator.  Thus, 
                                                     
10 In the US, it is not at all obvious who the adjudicator should be.  The FCC retains responsibility for commercial 
spectrum management and the NTIA for civilian federal spectrum management.  Further, courts have jurisdiction 
for resolving property disputes.  Thus, the adjudication venues must be defined in advance. 
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the sensor must be able to distinguish an LTE signal in the passband from other electromagnetic 
energy above the threshold.  In addition, for long term credibility, the detection mechanism must 
be free from incentives to over- or under-report events. While a variety of institutional 
arrangements may be possible, it is likely than an independent sensor network (similar to what 
was proposed in [14]) would emerge as an SU might distrust a PU-operated sensing system (and 
vice versa) because the PU would have an incentive to maximize penalty payments from the SU. 
It is likely that the sensing would be performed (at least) by the PU, since they would be making 
claims for adjudication.  SU may wish to have an independent sensor to (1) validate the claim of 
the PU and (2) provide additional information that the PU may not provided.  Such additional 
information might include the direction of the interfering signal and the ID of the mobile unit that 
transmitted the offending signal.  A mutually trusted third party could also provide sensing 
information [15] to both the primary and secondary users if the costs of sensing are too high.  
3. Sensing Network Topology 
As mentioned above, there is a need for a sensing network that should be able to detect 
interference events that caused by SUs as part of ex post enforcement. It is a critical part of the 
enforcement process (i.e. ex post side) in this shared environment. There is a tradeoff between 
the cost of sensing network and its accuracy to detect the interference events. Here is a list of 
possible topologies that will elaborate more about the cost and precision in this regards. 
 Table (2): Possible sensing network topologies. 
Type Enforcement 
Exclusion 
Zone Size 
Sensing 
Cost 
Spectrum 
efficiency 
Enforcement 
precision 
Comments 
A 
Ex ante 100% 
Largest Nothing Lowest N/A 
No sensing network. This is just 
hypothetical topology that we do 
not expect to be realistic. Ex post 0% 
B 
Ex ante 90% 
Large Low Low Very low 
Single sensing tower at the 
MetSat location. Ex post 10% 
E 
Ex ante 50% 
Medium 
High/ 
Medium 
Medium Good 
Sensing Network around the 
exclusion zone to detect any SUs 
entering the exclusion zone. This 
type is possible if there is high level 
of trust between the PU and SUs. Ex post 50% 
D 
Ex ante 30% 
Small High High Accurate 
Sensing Network around and 
within the exclusion zone. It is the 
most expected topology especially 
at the early stage of sharing 
process. 
Ex post 70% 
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E. Enforcement Scenarios 
1. Exclusion Zones 
Static exclusion zones would rely largely on a database. This database would be an operational 
mechanism by which each exclusion zone would be defined. It is likely that the PU would maintain 
a reference database that would be copied by the SUs and incorporated into their operational 
LTE networks. While a static exclusion zone is relatively straight-forward to enforce, it has high 
opportunity costs, as noted above. Even with exclusion zones, co-channel interference is 
possible. If exclusion zones are sized to avoid interference, then there may not be a strong basis 
for ex post action, except to determine if the interfering station was located within the exclusion 
zone during the interference episode. Unless there is a sensor network that broadly covers the 
exclusion zone, then it will be difficult to offer concrete evidence of SU transmission within the 
exclusion zone. 
Ex post enforcement in this scenario could be used to (1) tune the contours of the exclusion zones 
to optimize operations and/or (2) detect violations of the exclusion zone by SUs. The costs of the 
objectives are quite different. In (1), a sensor network to localize the strength and direction of SU 
associated interference events is sufficient. This would require sensing near the PU’s earth 
stations. Eight sensors may be sufficient to provide the information needed to optimize the 
exclusion zone (through the database) to minimize interference events. In (2), the sensor network 
would have to be more comprehensive since the PU would seek to demonstrate SU operation 
within the exclusion zone. This cannot be done definitively from the PU earth station, so a 
network of sensors would have to be constructed. The costs become higher, as signal detection 
and localization capability for the entire exclusion zone must be provided. The number of sensors 
would clearly be higher in the case. 
2. Protection Zones 
Recently, CSMAC proposed to eliminate exclusion zones entirely in favor of protection zones [16].  
This would allow SU operation as long as the aggregate received co-channel interference at the 
PU antenna is below a yet to be determined threshold11.  Protection zones are smaller than 
exclusion zones (14 – 95 km vs 72 – 121 km, depending on the location in question).  For the 
Suitland MD site, the protection zone still encompasses the Washington DC metro area.   
This scenario essentially reorganizes the locus of enforcement from ex ante toward ex post, since 
protected zones would definitely require spectrum sensing and an adjudication procedure.  
Because transmission could be permitted in the protection zone, its opportunity cost would likely 
be substantially lower than that of the exclusion zone ($1.1 billion according to [17]). 
In the case of protection zones, sensing at the PU’s earth station is sufficient, as the metric of 
interest is the IPSD12. The sensors must be configured to measure this value and attribute it 
                                                     
11 The CSMAC Working Group 1 Final Report [15] uses a new Interference Power Spectral Density (IPSD) measure 
as the essential threshold. 
12 It should be noted that this sensing metric (i.e. IPSD) at the PU’s location is different from the sensor network 
idea, they can work together to perform different jobs. Both are part of ex post enforcement. 
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appropriately to the SU(s). This may require somewhat more post processing to estimate low 
level IPSD values, but may not result in significantly more costly sensors. 
The existence of this zone also implies a database that defines its boundary. Thus, this approach 
would have to use a database similar to the exclusion zone approach. Operationally, the SUs 
would have to estimate the signal energy they are generating within the protection zone so as 
not to exceed the IPSD threshold. Feedback from sensors around the PU’s earth station would be 
critical to optimizing this approach. 
The larger unknown is the cost of ex post enforcement. The Final Report [10] does not address 
adjudication or the consequences of exceeding the IPSD threshold. If an adjudication procedure 
exists, then the interference events must be documented and attention paid to issues such as 
provenance and chain-of-custody, which requires back-end information system expenses. It may 
also require ongoing attention of an individual to act as a liaison between the adjudicator and/or 
the secondary user. 
The protection zone is always dynamic and will change with time and LTE-UE density. Since the 
metric based on aggregated interference level at the PU location, it depends on the number of 
active LTE-UE around it. If there are only a few LTE-UE around, it would be relatively small, 
becoming larger as the number of LTE-UEs increase. Thus, the zone boundaries will move based 
on the activity of the SUs. 
3. Ex Post Only 
Taken further, the parties could rely exclusively on ex post enforcement. In such a scenario, the 
penalties for interference would be set so that the SU would have an incentive to discover profit 
maximizing protected zones. That is, if the cost of interference is sufficiently high, the SU would 
find it advantageous to modify their behavior in a way that balances the consequence of 
interference with the consequence of not transmitting in a region. Such a system would require 
regular calibration of the interference penalties so that the PU’s operational SINR can be attained. 
This approach would not require a database (i.e. database that defines the boundary of a zone) 
and therefore assumes that the SU would handle this mission at its expense. It would require the 
establishment and operation of a sensor network as well as the adjudication-oriented 
information system. If adjudication can be automated, this approach could perhaps be made 
more efficient; see figure (7) for an illustration of expected sizes of these different enforcement 
scenarios zones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (7): Example of different enforcement scenarios show the relative size of each one to the others.  
Protection Zone 
Exclusion Zone 
Ex Post Zone 
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F. Summary 
The approach that outlines obligations most clearly is the “exclusion zone” enforcement scenario.  
This scenario requires a database and an extensive sensor network and an as-yet poorly defined 
adjudication system.  This approach also has the highest opportunity cost and provides the 
fewest opportunities for adaptive learning. 
The “protection zones” enforcement scenario defines a maximum IPSD that can be present at 
the PU’s earth station, and permits some operations in the (smaller) protection zones as long as 
the IPSD is not exceeded. This also requires the development of an ex post adjudication 
procedure.  This enforcement scenario would also require a database, though it may be sufficient 
to have sensors near the earth station and not throughout the protection zone.  The opportunity 
cost for this scenario would clearly be smaller than the exclusion zone scenario, since the 
protection zones are smaller and some operations within them are permitted.  Without a detailed 
analysis, one could assume that the opportunity cost scales linearly with the ratio of the 
populations affected by the two types of zones.  Since some operations are permitted inside the 
protection zone, this approach is more amenable to learning and adaption. 
The final one is the “ex post only” enforcement scenario.  Here, a database would not be needed, 
and a sensor network surrounding the earth station would be sufficient.  A robust and efficient 
adjudication system with predictable outcomes and penalties would be important in this 
scenario, however, since it is likely that more interference events would occur.  This would result 
in a highly flexible and adaptive system and one that could yield ex ante rules that are aimed at 
reducing adjudication costs in the future.   
V. Case Study-B: 3.5 GHz  
In the Fast Track report [8], NTIA recommended reallocating 100 megahertz of the 3550-3650 
MHz band for wireless broadband use within five years (Fast Track report published in October 
2010). In this section, we will describe the recommended sharing scenarios from enforcement 
point of view. 
A. Incumbent Users 
The 3500-3650 MHz band13 (150MHz) is used by DoD radar systems with installations on land, 
ships and aircrafts. Based on the NTIA [8], most of the aircraft and land-based systems are 
operated at military training areas and test ranges, recognizing that tactical necessities ultimately 
determine operational requirements. Functions performed by these systems include search for 
near-surface and high altitude airborne objects, sea surveillance, tracking of airborne objects, air 
traffic control, formation flight, and multi-purpose test range instrumentation [8]. 
After considering options to reallocate the entire 3500-3650 MHz or to reallocate a portion of it, 
the NTIA concluded that the 3550-3650 MHz (100MHz) band offers an opportunity to implement 
wireless broadband over large portions of the United States.  
                                                     
13 It should be noted that all the NTIA analysis based on the band 3500-3650 MHz (150MHz); in the end they 
recommend the use of the upper 100MHz (3550-3650MHz).  
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The types of analysis that were performed in assessing compatibility between wireless base 
stations and mobile/portable stations and Federal systems operating in the 3500-3650 MHz band 
are summarized in appendix-C. The following subsections will cover the main type of PUs at this 
band. It should be noted that there are non-Federal uses in this band as it is also allocated to the 
radiolocation service on a secondary basis (not protected). 
1. Ground-Based Radar Systems 
DoD has two mobile ground based radar systems. The first is Ground Based Radar One (GB-1) 
which is specifically designed to locate the firing positions of both rocket and mortar launchers. 
The Army operates GB-1 radar at many locations within the U.S. However, the sites requiring 
exclusion zones provided in Table (3) was limited to the locations where the radar requires use 
of its full tuning range. The radar does not require use of the upper portion of its tuning range at 
the many other locations. Ground Based Radar Three (GB-3) is a multi-function system that 
provides surveillance, air traffic control and fire quality data [8]. The Ground-Based Radar Two 
(GB-2) are interference limited systems (as opposed to noise limited systems) and are associated 
with Airborne Radars. 
Based on the NTIA analysis [8], it was concluded that there is a need for an exclusion zone to 
protect the ground-based radars. The exclusion zone creates separation distances on the order 
of several hundred kilometers. It should be noted that a number of “GB-1” and “GB-3” sites 
required limited exclusion zones protection. To accommodate this much-reduced number of 
exclusion zones, the radio frequency filter of the base stations would need to provide 30 to 40 
dB of attenuation at 3500 MHz (approximately 50 MHz below the band of interest, 3550-3650 
MHz) to mitigate the potential of high-power interference effects. A plot of the exclusion zones 
is shown in Figure (8). The radius of the exclusion zones around the ground-based radar systems 
are given in Table (4). 
GB-1 Installation Name GB-3 Installation Name 
Fort Stewart, Georgia MCB Camp Pendleton, California 
Fort Carson, Colorado MCAS Miramar, California 
Fort Hood, Texas MAGTFTC 29 Palms, California 
Fort Riley, Kansas MCMWTC Bridgeport, California 
Fort Polk, Louisiana MCAS Yuma, Arizona 
Fort Knox, Kentucky MCB Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina Fort Drum, New York MCB Quantico, Virginia 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina MCAS Cherry Point, North 
Carolina Fort Wainwright, Alaska Bogue Field, North Carolina 
Fort Lewis, Washington MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina 
White Sands Missile Range Virginia Beach, Virginia 
Yuma Proving Ground Fort Worth, Texas 
Fort Irwin, California Cheyenne, Wyoming 
 Ft Sill, Oklahoma 
 Aurora, Colorado 
 Pensacola, Florida 
 Ft Bliss, Texas 
Table (3): Ground-Based Radar – 1 and 3 Installation Locations 
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Radar to Wireless 
Syste
m 
Interaction 
Ground-Based Radar – 1 Ground-Based Radar – 2 Ground-Based Radar – 3 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone 
(km) 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone 
(km) 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone 
(km) 
Radar to Base 
(Single Entry) 
50 40 40 < 1 50 63 
Radar to Mobile 
(Single Entry) 
50 < 1 40 < 1 50 3.5 
Base and Mobile to 
Radar (Aggregate) 
50 24 40 < 1 50 32 
Table (4): Summary of Exclusion Zones based on NTIA analysis, Ground-Based Radar Systems working at the full 
band (3500-3650 MHz) 
 
Figure (8): Plot of Exclusion Zones, Ground-Based Radar Systems. 
2. Airborne Radar Systems 
The NTIA concluded that, a frequency offset of 50 MHz was needed in order to minimize the 
required separation distances. As shown in the analysis, co-frequency operation with the 
airborne radar systems would require large exclusion zones (in excess of 300 km). Furthermore, 
establishing exclusions is generally not a practical approach to sharing with airborne systems. 
Therefore, NTIA concluded that a frequency offset of approximately 40 MHz was needed to 
eliminate the need for exclusion zones for airborne radar systems14 ; see Table (5). 
                                                     
14 This is one of the rationales for limiting the sharing band to 3550-3650MHz instead of the full 3500-3650MHz. 
19 
 
Radar to Wireless 
System 
Interaction 
Airborne Radar – 1 Airborne Radar – 2 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone (km) 
Frequency 
Offset 
(MHz) 
Radius of 
Exclusion 
Zone (km) 
Radar to Base 
(Single Entry) 
40 < 1 40 < 1 
Radar to Mobile 
(Single Entry) 
40 < 1 40 < 1 
Base and Mobile to 
Radar (Aggregate) 
40 < 1 40 < 1 
Table (5): Summary of Exclusion Zones based on NTIA analysis, Airborne Radar Systems  
3. Shipborne Radar Systems 
In shipborne radar case, the exclusion zone is defined by a distance from the coast line 
considering interference to and from the shipborne radar. In developing the exclusion zone 
distance (i.e. NTIA analysis), it was assumed that the shipborne radar was operating 10 km from 
the coastline. Figure (9) shows an example of expected exclusion zone for one of the shipborne 
radars. 
 
Figure (9): Exclusion Zone Distances for one type of Shipborne Radar Systems 
B. Why 3.5GHz? 
Based on the NTIA Fast Track Evaluation report [8], the 3500-3650 MHz frequency range is 
divided into the 3500-3600 and 3600-3650 MHz bands in the U.S. National Table of Frequency 
Allocations. These two frequency bands include allocations to Federal radiolocation and 
radionavigation services. Therefore, since the bands represent similar uses throughout 3500-
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3650 MHz band, the 3500-3600 and 3600-3650 MHz bands have been addressed as a single 
frequency band in the NTIA analysis. 
The reasons to select 3550-3650 MHz band by NTIA are: (1) WiMAX equipment has already been 
developed and deployed in this band within US (2) federal operations in the band are 
geographically limited; and (3) the band has already been allocated for fixed services in other 
parts of the world [8]. Based on [18], the spectrum sharing (geographically) in this band relies on 
exclusion zones along the U.S. coastline to protect base stations from high power U.S. Navy radar 
systems. Furthermore, exclusion zones will be required around a limited number of fixed land 
sites and some training and test sites to protect other military operations [8]. 
C. Multi-Tiered Shared Access Model 
The FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order (NPRO) on December 12, 2012, in 
which they propose to create a new Citizens Broadband Service in the 3550-3650 MHz band [18]. 
The FCC proposed the idea of multi-tiered shared access model which reflects the PCAST report 
[6] recommendations.  The FCC proposed that the 3.5GHz band be managed by a Spectrum 
Access System (SAS) incorporating a dynamic database. The SAS would ensure that multi-tiered 
users operate in a way that does not cause harmful interference to incumbent users and could 
also help manage interference protection among other users. The three tiers of service would 
be:  
1. Incumbent Access (IA) 
The IA tier would consist solely of authorized federal users at 3.5GHz band. These 
Incumbent access users would be protected from harmful interference from tier-2 and 
tier-3 users through appropriate regulatory and technical means.  
2. Priority Access (PA) 
This Tier-2 access is relatively new to spectrum sharing. PA allows authorized users 
(mainly federal and utility agencies) to operate with minimal quality-of-service and with 
interference protection in portions of the 3.5 GHz band wherever they exist. PA users 
would be eligible to use authorized devices on an interference protected basis within their 
facilities as controlled by the SAS.  
 
The PA tier would be available only in areas where spectrum sharing does not cause any 
interference to the IA users; in addition, they do not expect to receive interference from 
IA users, see Figure (10). Those qualified PA users can expect protection from harmful 
interference from other operations from the same or lower tier of users within their 
facilities. The network used at this tier need not be small cell, though the FCC has not 
recommended any strategy in this regard. 
3. General Authorized Access (GAA) 
This is Tier-3 and it is equivalent to what is commonly called “secondary users”. The GAA 
tier would be assigned for use by the general public using small cell technologies on an 
opportunistic, non-interfering basis. The GAA tier could include a wide range of residential 
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or business including wireless telephone and Internet service providers. The FCC 
proposed to authorize GAA use in zones where small cell use would not interfere with IA 
or PA users.  
 
 
Figure (10): Conceptual illustration how the different tiers, and corresponding zones, might interrelate from a 
geographic perspective within the 3.5 GHz Band [18]. 
D. Small Cell Applications 
The PCAST report [6] and The FCC NPRO [18] recommended using small cell in 3.5GHz band as a 
way to allow spectrum sharing and increase spectral efficiency. Small cells are low-powered 
wireless base stations intended to cover small indoor or outdoor areas ranging in size from homes 
and offices to stadiums, shopping malls, and metropolitan outdoor spaces. They include 
femtocells, picocells, and microcells. Generally speaking, small cells are typically used to extend 
wireless coverage to areas with poor macro-cell coverage or where traffic is concentrated. It is 
expected that the first wave of these small cells at 3.5GHz band will be indoor as the first step on 
a gradual path toward outdoor small cell applications. 
Neither the PCAST report nor the FCC document specifies the type of technology that will be used 
to provide small cell solutions. It will be left to the market to decide which is best to exploit this 
sharing opportunity.  One of the major candidate is a LTE femtocells because many commercial 
LTE operators are seeking solutions to overcome the shortage in spectrum to keep up with the 
increase in mobile broadband traffic. Femtocells are an integral part of future LTE networks. It is 
part of the principle of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) where the mobile network is 
constructed with layers of small and large cells. 
E. Proposed Licensing Model 
There is some similarity in the proposed spectrum sharing approach with the television white 
spaces (TVWS). However, in this case we have three tiers of users, so the database must deal 
with two protected user classes (i.e. Incumbent and Priority Access users) which adds more 
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complexity. The most important thing is that the licensing model should be light especially for 
the General Authorized Access users. As FCC mentioned in [18];  
“We proposed to establish the Citizen’s Broadband Service by rule under Section 
307(e) of the Communications Act. We believe that a license-by-rule licensing 
framework would allow for rapid deployment of small cells by a wide range of 
users, including consumers, enterprises, and service providers, at low cost and with 
minimal barriers to entry. Much wireless broadband use occurs indoors or in other 
enclosed facilities. Typically, the owners or users of such facilities already have 
access to the siting permissions, backhaul facilities, electrical power, and other key 
non-spectrum inputs for the provision of service. Moreover, as explained above, 
our proposal for small cell operation at the relatively high frequency 3.5 GHz Band 
would generally tend to contain service within such facilities, allowing for a very 
high degree of spectrum reuse. Therefore, authorizing these end users - or their 
agents or assignees - to have direct access to the 3.5 GHz Band in the physical 
locations that they otherwise are able to access would seem to facilitate 
expeditious and low-cost provision of service. A license-by-rule framework is very 
compatible with and conducive toward these aims.” 
The IA users will be protected by an exclusion zone. This exclusion zones can take many forms 
that will be addressed late in this paper. The GAA uses the spectrum opportunistically with a light 
licensing regime (i.e. small cells). The new user type in this case study are the PA users. The FCC 
proposed that PA users will be authorized to operate within a substantial portion of contiguous 
spectrum (in this paper, we assume that 50 MHz will be set for the Priority Access users), subject 
to the technical rules that are ultimately adopted in this proceeding. So, “PA eligible users” would 
be required to register their identity along with the location of their facilities in the SAS. The 
database would authorize PA use only by eligible users operating within eligible facilities within 
designated geographic areas. Also, the PA is different from traditional secondary access (e.g. 
unlicensed TVWS); see Figure (11). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure (11): Illustration of how the licensing model will be.  
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This licensing model may require adjustment with time and experience, so there should be some 
trials to explore different licensing scenarios. In addition, the size of the small cells can be 
different, and do not have to be the same all the time and everywhere. From Figure (11), they 
could be small in a “GAA zone” and relatively large in the “PA and GAA zone”. 
There should be a defined “interference threshold” from which it will be easy to distinguish the 
interference events.  Interference can come from transmitter (regular interference event) or a 
poor receiver filter (bad design of incumbent receiver). It is expected that the radio vendors will 
favor a multilateral industry solution over a government run solution. This is generally similar to 
the tradeoff between ex ante (complicated device standardization) and ex post (simple 
standardization with powerful detection network to monitor the band) enforcement approaches. 
F. Exclusion Zones  
Figure (5) illustrates the how exclusion zones are related to each usage tier. The distance (d1) is 
based on the minimum distance that neither the PA nor the GAA users will cause harmful 
interference to the IA users. So, it will depend heavily on how the IA network will tolerate the 
interference. The distance (d2) is measured based on the minimum distance that the PA users 
will not receive any interference from the IA users, where the PA users expected protection from 
all type of harmful interference. The distance (d3) is only limited, by another (distant) GAA zone 
(i.e, another d2 from other incumbent usages). Interference from IA users may be expected over 
the entire blue area. It should be noted that these boundaries are with respect to the IA users 
only. There are another domain or exclusion zones between the PA and GAA that are similar to 
MetSat case study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d1 This distance is calculated based on the minimum distance that the PA and GAA users will may cause an interference to 
the Incumbent users (to prevent interference to the IA). 
d2 This distance base no possible interference from IA to PA users (not GAA). 
d3 This is an open distance from east-coast to the west-coast, unless there are another exclusion zone due to Incumbent 
ground-based system usages. 
Figure (12): Illustration of exclusion zones.  
Exclusion Zone 
IA usages only 
GAA usages only 
 No priority  access usages on 
this zone 
 Expected interference from 
Incumbent to GAA 
 Not protected usage right 
PA and GAA usages  
 PA usages on this zone based on 
sharing policy with GAA 
 No interference from Incumbent 
to PA 
 Not protected usage right for GAA 
 
 
d1 d2 d3 
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G. The Role of Sensing 
Unlike the MetSat case, there is a need to sense the IA users (i.e. PUs) at the case sharing 
environment. The most challenging IA applications are the shipborne radars case. Since the IA 
user is a military user, tactical imperatives mean that neither their presence nor technical 
characteristics (signal shape, power level, etc.) will be available to GAA or PA users. A sensor 
network could be deployed to monitor the band for low level signal emissions that do not match 
the operating parameters of GAA or PA users. For shipborne radars, sensors could be deployed 
along the coasts, alerting users to the presence of a possible IA user. These users could then 
operate so as to avoid possible interference with the potential IA user. While this would leave 
GAA and PA users exposed to spoofing by malicious users, it would protect IA users. It would also 
make no requirements on IA users to reveal their location or their technical parameters. 
Through an antenna pointing inland, the sensors could also detect the signal levels of GAA and 
PA users to ensure that signal levels are low enough to avoid interference. The sensor data fusion 
center (perhaps part of SAS) could proactively alert GAA users whose signal levels are too high. 
The sensor output may also be archived as evidence in a possible ex post adjudication claim. 
The Continental US has approximately 12,383 miles of coastline15, so a sensor every 5 miles would 
mean that approximately 2400 sensors would need to be deployed for this application.  The 
capital costs will vary significantly based on the required accuracy of its deliverables and the 
operating costs dependent heavily on backhaul.  However, if local processing is performed so 
that only alerts are sent, backhaul may not require a high bit rate.   
H. Enforcement Scenarios 
1. Exclusion Zones 
The exclusion zone for IA expected to cover many dense population areas and cities in the US. 
Large geographic exclusion zones would be imposed along the East, West, and Gulf Coasts to 
protect incumbent shipborne radar operations. Exclusion zones are also expected to protect 
ground-based radar systems.  
Access to the 3.5 GHz band will require new database systems that facilitate dynamic spectrum 
access. This database would be an operational mechanism by which each exclusion zone would 
be defined. Again, if exclusion zones are sized to avoid interference, then there may not be a 
strong basis for ex post action, except to determine the interfering station that may be located 
within the exclusion zone during the interference episode.  
It may be impossible to take ex post action against a transmitter that was operating outside the 
exclusion zone even if caused co-channel interference to the IA user.  This realization would cause 
IA users to argue for the largest exclusion zone possible.  In the NTIA Fast Track Report 
recommended frequency and geographic separation to mitigate interference, assuming 
traditional macro-cell network deployments. NTIA recommended exclusion zones around 
ground-based and shipborne radar systems. With respect to shipborne radars, NTIA determined 
                                                     
15 From http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerica/usstates/uslandst.htm.  Retrieved on 20 July 
2013. 
25 
 
that extremely large geographic exclusion zones are necessary, reaching a maximum of 557 
kilometers from one type of shipborne radar into a base station located in the Gulf Coast region. 
Based upon NTIA’s exclusion zone calculations for shipborne radar systems in 3.5 GHz Band, we 
estimate that approximately 60 percent of the United States population fall within an exclusion 
zone. NTIA’s analysis only considered WiMAX technology for shared use of the 3.5 GHz Band. The 
small cell and access management technologies proposed in FCC NPRO [18] alter some of the 
assumptions in NTIA’s analysis. Ex post enforcement in this scenario could be used to detect 
violations of the exclusion zone by SUs. The costs of the objectives are quite different. 
It is expected that “exclusion scenario” is less likely to be applied at 3.5GHz band, due to the 
following: 
 The expected size of exclusion zone is very large. It should be minimized at the expense 
of adding more ex post enforcement techniques. 
 100MHz is a valuable amount of spectrum in a very attractive band to commercial 
operators. By using exclusion zone only (ex ante) the opportunity cost will be very high. 
 Based on figure (12) above: 
o By varying the size of exclusion zone, we are referring to the distance (d1) since 
(d2) is based on the level of interference from IA to PA users. This means the 
opportunity cost mentioned above is the opportunity cost for the GAA users only 
(not the PA). 
o In reference to NTIA report, if large exclusion zones are maintained around the 
ground-based radar system, it is likely that GAA users cannot exploit this sharing 
opportunity in the southern half of the USA. 
2. Protection Zones 
In this scenario, the PA and GAA users would be allowed to share the spectrum with the IA users 
as long as the aggregate received co-channel interference at the IA antenna is below a yet to be 
determined threshold. So, protection zones are smaller than exclusion zones. The existence of 
this zone also implies a dynamic database that defines its boundary. Thus, this approach would 
have to use a database similar to the exclusion zone scenario. Because transmission could be 
permitted in the protection zone, its opportunity cost would likely be substantially lower than 
that of the exclusion zone. 
Enforcement could involve unilaterally disabling those GAA users who are interfering with the IA 
or it could involve an adjudication procedure for assessing penalties (as part of ex post 
enforcement).  In the former scenario, IA users minimize their technical risks whereas the latter 
case sets the stage for a more bi-laterally adaptive approach to sharing.  If an adjudication 
procedure exists, then the interference events must be documented and attention paid to issues 
such as provenance and chain-of-custody, which requires back-end information system 
expenses. 
One of the things that makes the ex post more complex at 3.5GHz case is that the GAA users (i.e. 
SUs) are most likely decentralized or at least multiple centralized operators. That adds more cost 
to the adjudication procedures. Moreover, the protection of PA adds another layer of complexity. 
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3. Ex Post Only 
As it is explaind before, the enforcement in this scenario relies exclusively on ex post 
enforcement. The penalties for interference would be set so that the PA and GAA users would 
have an incentive to discover profit maximizing protected zones while simultaneously protecting 
the IA from co-channel interference. That is, if the cost of interference is sufficiently high, the PA 
and GAA would find it advantageous to modify their behavior in a way that balances the 
consequence of interference with the consequence of not transmitting in a region.  
The SAS would manage the spectrum sharing at 3.5GHz band and would ensure that the PA and 
GAA users would not operate in a manner that would cause harmful interference to the IA. In 
addition to the need for a database, this scenario requires the establishment and operation of a 
sensor network as well as the adjudication-oriented information system.  
The big concern about this approach is the cost and complexity as well as the technical risk to the 
IA’s operations. Due to the large borders of IA operations; it is technically challenging and 
expensive to build an ex post enforcement system that meets the IA user needs while being 
“reasonable” and lawful for the GAA users. The positive side is that the exclusion/protected zone 
would be minimized. 
I. Summary 
In this band, the ground based radars and shipborne radars need some kind of protection; 
however, there is no need to protect the airborne radars. It is proposed that 3.5GHz band be 
managed by a Spectrum Access System (SAS) incorporating a dynamic database. The SAS would 
ensure that multi-tiered users operate in a way that does not cause harmful interference to 
incumbent users and could also help manage interference protection among other users. The 
three tiers of service would be (1) Incumbent Access (2) Priority Access (3) General Authorized 
Access. 
In this case study, three enforcement scenarios are illustrated. (1) “Exclusion zones” would be 
imposed along the East, West, and Gulf Coasts to protect incumbent shipborne radar operations 
and ground-based radar systems. The expected size of exclusion zone is very large. It should be 
minimized at the expenses of adding more ex post enforcement methodologies. This scenarion 
is less likely to be the adopted enforcement mechanism due to the high opportunity cost and the 
100MHz is a valuable amount of spectrum in a very attractive band to commercial operators. (2) 
“Protected zones” rely on the idea to share the spectrum with the incumbent as long as the 
aggregate received co-channel interference at is below certain threshold. This is most likely to be 
the adopted enforcement scenario. (3) The third scenario is a logical extension of the protection 
zone concept to not define a zone at all, but simply to define a threshold that cannot be 
exceeded. 
There are three tiers of users, so, the database must deal with two protected user classes (i.e. 
Incumbent and Priority Access users) which adds more complexity. The licensing model may not 
be right and accurate the first time; there should be a need for trials to explore different licensing 
scenarios. There should be a defined “interference threshold” from which it will be easy to 
distinguish the interference events whether it is caused by a transmitter or a poor receiver filter. 
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The first wave could be indoor application only. A spectrum sharing test-bed is very important in 
the band. 
VI. Conclusions and Future Research 
Spectrum sharing agreements that do not explicitly define obligations and their enforcement are 
essentially non-binding [9] and thus provide no protection for incumbents. The emergent nature 
of DSA systems suggests that enforcement approaches should allow for learning from direct 
experience as well as the experiences of other DSA systems.   
In this paper, we consider the tradeoffs of different enforcement approaches by examining the 
sharing opportunity between Federal and commercial users. The analysis in this paper is based 
on the recognition that some interference events are inevitable in spectrum sharing.  Thus, the 
ex ante and ex post enforcement mechanisms serve to separate the interference events by 
consequence on the primary user’s operation and to reduce the probability of interference 
events that have a consequence that is considered significant.  
In general, an enforcement approach is considered to be more precise if it more specifically 
differentiates legitimate users and uses from illegitimate ones [19]. The cost of this depends on 
some attributes of the system itself. Exclusion zones with their databases are part of the ex ante 
enforcement mechanisms.  In the absence of sensing, they are relatively imprecise mechanisms.  
There are large payoffs to reduce the size of the exclusion zone, perhaps doing so by making it 
dynamic, and to distinguish legitimate uses and users from illegitimate ones. On the other hand, 
ex post mechanisms involve the adjudication of actual interference events; they typically involve 
collecting information that can be used in agreed-upon adjudication procedures.  In the absence 
of particular procedures, we can assume this information would include the detection of 
interference events attributable to the SU(s).  These are more precise (in general) but may be 
more costly and certainly are not helpful in a particular interference episode, as they cannot 
technically remediate harm.  Instead, they act by deterring future events.   
The overall lessons from this case study is that enforcement approaches, costs and tradeoffs are 
quite situation-specific.  Further, it is as yet not possible to determine a “best” approach to 
enforcement as the costs of adjudication are highly uncertain and dependent on the particulars 
of the sharing circumstances.  Despite this, we believe that, through detailed analysis of many 
spectrum sharing situations (similar to the two cases presented here), an array of useful 
approaches to enforcement will emerge.  This is consistent with the notion of learning and 
harvesting “best practices” that was discussed in [9].   
In the same way, abstract analyses of this kind are a relatively poor substitute for actual 
operation.  We have much to learn about how sensing can assist spectrum sharing in practice, 
especially when it comes to matters of the required sensor density and what information is 
sufficient for adjudication, and how easy (or difficult) it is to acquire this information.   
There are a few topics for future research that emerge from this paper.  Most directly, 
additional case studies should be performed, such as the ones presented here, which will help 
build a “catalog” of enforcement approaches.  Such a collection may enable the development of 
recommended initial approaches for various spectrum sharing circumstances. 
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Practically, however, this line of research cannot meaningfully move forward in the absence of 
a better understanding of the costs of adjudication.   These costs, in turn, depend on methods 
and systems used to collect data, determine fault, assess penalties, and handle appeals.  If this 
can be routinized so that costs are low, then an adaptive, flexible ex-post-oriented approach to 
enforcement may be possible.   
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Appendix A:  Summary of “Analysis Results” at the NTIA Fast Track report (Oct 2010) [8] 
The NTIA did technical analysis summarized as follow: 
 Radiosonde Transmitter 
As shown in the analysis and the simulation, radiosonde transmitters operating in the 
1676-1683 MHz band will not cause interference to base station receivers operating 
above 1695 MHz. 
 Radiosonde Receive Stations 
Based on the analysis results, if mobile/portable station transmitters are limited to 
operation above 1695 MHz there will be no interference to radiosonde receive stations. 
 Meteorological-Satellite Transmitters 
No interference to base station receivers is predicted from GOES transmitters and POES 
transmitters operating in and adjacent to the 1695-1710 MHz band. 
 Meteorological-Satellite Receive Stations 
NTIA chose to limit its technical analysis and the development of exclusion zones to the 
systems that operate in the 1695-1710 MHz portion of the band after considering a few 
factors. First, a large number of transportable Federal and non-Federal meteorological-
satellite earth station receivers operate at a frequency of 1692.7 MHz. Many of these 
receivers support emergency management. Because they do not require licenses, the 
users and their locations are unknown. Furthermore, some of these receivers operate on 
mobile platforms. Therefore, it is not possible to develop exclusion zones around these 
earth stations.  
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Appendix B:  Summary of Exclusion Zones Around Meteorological-Satellite Receive 
Stations [8] 
 
Earth Station Location Latitude Longitude 
Exclusion Zone 
Radius (km) 
Wallops Island, Virginia 375645N 752745W 90 
Fairbanks, Alaska 644814N 1475234W 90 
Suitland, Maryland 384900N 765100W 121 
Miami, Florida 254700N 801900W 110 
Kaena Point/Hickam Air Force 
Base/Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 211907N 1575521W 110 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 433409N 963733W 80 
Cincinnati, Ohio 390608N 843036W 97 
Rock Island, Illinois 413104N 903346W 78 
St. Louis, Missouri 383526N 901225W 76 
Vicksburg, Mississippi 322123N 905129W 72 
Omaha, Nebraska 411532N 955520W 76 
Sacramento, California 383459N 1212939W 72 
Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska
b
 613600N 150000W 110 
Anderson Air Force Base, Guam 133452N 1445528E 110 
Monterey, California 363600N 1215400W 110 
Stennis Space Center, Mississippi 302359N 893559W 110 
Twenty-Nine-Palms, California
a
 341746N 1160944W 110 
Yuma, Arizona
a
 323924N 1143622W 110 
Note a: Earth station is transportable. 
Note b: Latitude and Longitude coordinates are for the center point of the exclusion zone, not the 
MetSat receive location. 
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Appendix C:  Types of Analysis Performed for the 3500-3650 MHz Band 16 
 
Transmitter Receiver Type of Analysis 
Ground-Based Radar 
Radar Base Station Adjacent Band Single Entry 
Radar Mobile/Portable Station Adjacent Band Single Entry 
Base and Mobile/Portable Stations Radar Adjacent Band Aggregate 
Airborne Radar 
Radar Base Station Adjacent Band Single Entry 
Radar Mobile/Portable Station Adjacent Band Single Entry 
Base and Mobile/Portable Stations Radar Adjacent Band Aggregate 
Shipborne Radar 
Radar Base Station Co-Frequency Single Entry 
Radar Mobile/Portable Station Co-Frequency Single Entry 
Base and Mobile/Portable Stations Radar Co-Frequency Aggregate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 This table from NTIA Fast Track report “An Assessment of the Near-Term Viability of Accommodating Wireless 
Broadband Systems in the 1675-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, 3500-3650 MHz, and 4200-4220 MHz, 4380-4400 MHz 
Bands”. 
